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6.1 s o c R A T E S ' DAIM Ο Λ/Ο Λ 1 3 9 
At ils first mention in Plato's Apology 31c Socrates refers to it as 
"something godlike and d u i n e " θείον τι και δαιμονιον . but 
elsewhere frequently as simply το δαιμόνιου. In its la tier use 
δαιμονιον is " elliptically substantival" Rid dell, 1867: 102 . an 
adjective flanked by a semantic hole where a substantive has to be 
understood; as Burnet reminds us in his note on Eu. 3B5, " there is 
no such noun-substantive as δαιμονιον in classical Greek'" and the 
regular use of the word in that way ""makes its first appearance in the 
Scptuügint. where it is pretty clearly a diminutive of δαίμων rather 
than the neuter of δαιμόνιος. "14° So in Plato we should always read 
the word as a contraction for the phrase we see filled out in R. 496c. 
" t h e divine s ign" τό δαιμονιον σημεϊον; and again in End. 2721:. 
" t h e customary divine sign" (το εΐωθός σημεϊον τά δαιμονιον = τό 
είωθος δαιμονιον σημεϊον: cf. Phdi. 242Β3 . 1 J 1 As Zeller noted 
I 1885: 82. n. 5 i. in Pialo the substantival use of τό δαιμονιον to refer 
to a divinity is restricted to his accusers; it is they who understand 
co craft were identity instead of mere analogy. If A is analogized to B. i: will be meant 
to hold forcefully and îllumînaiingly, if ii is a good analogy in some, but b\ no means 
in all. respects. T h e crucial difference for Socrates is that no ordinary craft is sufficient to 
ensure happiness .the pilot tan >a\e his passenger's lives, but docs not presume to ensure 
thai the lives he saves will be worth living: G 511D—51 2 B ; , which is precisely what 
Socrates holds chat virtue doc^ ensure so e.a at G. 507B7—07 fquoicd as T22 in eh. 8] . 
138 The qualification at 376B4—6, "Hence he who does wrong and shameful and unjust things 
voluntarily, Ο Hîppîas, if there be such a man. is none other than the good :uan. ' has often 
been noted. 139 Cf. eh. t>. p. 107. 
[40 He also reminds us that Socrates' daimonion "is ne*.er called a δαίμων, though the idea of 
the 5α;μων as A guardian spirit was quite familiar" he. cil.). 
141 There is no textual foundation for the assumption Edmunds. 1985: 31 l ci passim that in 
Plato τ ο δαιμόνιου is a contraction for " t h e divine thing " 
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άλλα δαιμόνια καινά rn mean the new deities which they allege 
Socrates introduced to take the place of the city's gods. No les«; 
significant is Socrates' alternative use of expressions in which 
δαιμονιον does not occur at all. replaced by phrases in which the 
operative word is " s i g n " : " t h e god's sign"' (τό τού 6eov σημεϊον, Αρ. 
4-θΒΐ : " t h e customary sign" τό είωθος σημεϊον, Ap. 40C3.1; or just 
" t h e sign'* (το σημεϊον. Ap. 4106). It comes to Socrates in the form 
of a "voice"', "this is what Ϊ have had since childhood: a voice 
comes to me. and when it comes it always turns me away from what 
I am about to do. never towards it"' [Ap. 31D: tr. after Allen). 
Xenophon's usage does not make this nearly as clear. Here the 
word is used as a quasi-substantive. Marchant is not clearly wrong 
in translating το δαιμονιον σημαίνειν at Mem. 1.1.4, " the deity gave 
a sign." The difference from Plato is not so marked as to require that 
translation. We could still read his phrase as " t h e divine [sign] 
signified": but if we did the resulting redundancy would suggest that 
Marchant's reading of the Greek phrase is more likely to be the right 
one. In any case, a material difference from Plato is that in 
Xenophon the daimonion docs a lot more work and of a different kind 
from any it ever does in Plato. In Xenophon its promptings to 
Socrates are not restricted to dissuasion : they also give positive 
injunctions and, what is still more striking, the daimonion affords 
Socrates an intelligence service he can use to benefit third parties as 
well : " for many of his companions he advised beforehand 
.ττροηγόρευε) to do this, not to do that, in accordance with the 
forewarnings of the dein ιτού δαιμονίου ττροσημαίνοντο$> ; those 
who heeded the advice prospered, those who did not would regret 
i t " he. cit. . 
This use of the daimonion as an occult prognosticaior, never 
encountered in Plato, occurs repeatedly in Xenophon both in the 
Memorabilia [1.1.4-5, Cllç<^ in part above and in the Apology of 
Socrates 13. where it is put on <\ par with prognostications by diviners 
and is again put to work for the benefit of Socrates' friends " I have 
announced to mam of my friends the advice [about future events] 
the god has given me and it has never turned out false"";.142 We see 
the daimonion functioning in this way again in the pseudo-Platonic 
Theages, and there its treatment as a divine being in its own right 
becomes explicit. Young Theages speaks of it as a fuil-fleclged 
142 For ihc difference in Xenophon's treatment of the daimonion by contrast with Plato's see 
Maier. 1913: 456-7: " I n Plato the daimonion docs not yet have the magical character 
which Xenophon has given." 
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divinity which they should "propi t ia te 1 1 3 by prayers and sacrifices 
and by any other means the diviners may prescribe." The youth's 
father endorses the suggestion, and Socrates goes along: "if it seems 
that we should do so. let us do i t " 131Λ . The mentality of the writer 
of this curious work is indicated by the fact that a young man is 
supposed to make moral progress simply by being in the same house 
with Socrates and " m u c h greater if [he] sat at Socrates' side and 
most of all when sitting right next to Socrates, touching h i m " 
1 3 0 E ) . 
Once we set aside the Theages (except as a monument to the level 
of credulity to which some of Socrates" superstitious admirers could 
sink after his death,, our choice of sources of information about the 
daimonion falls between Plato and Xenophon. And if we assume that 
in this case, no less than in that of the others that have been noticed 
previously in chapter 3 and will be noticed again in the present 
c h a p t e r 1 1 4 and in additional note 7.1. the former's testimony should 
be preferred as that of the more reliable witness, then the first thing 
we should do in our effort to get to the bottom of this very puzzling 
feature of Socrates' conduct is to follow out the implications of his 
unique susceptibility to certain peculiar mental states which he 
construes as signs from the god. Does he sec in these signs revelation 
in the proper sense of the word, i.e. "knowledge disclosed to man by 
divine or supernatural agencv "?1 4° To do so he would have had to 
think of the god as providing him with not only a the sign, whose 
presentational content is immediately clear, but also {b) the sign's 
correr! interpretation, which is not immediately clear, and may be 
highly problematic. That Socraies assumes that ^ is true is clear 
enough in our texts. That he also believes that ibi is true is not: there 
is not a single Platonic text in which Socrates says or implies that the god causes 
him not only to hear "the voice" but also to dacern the right interpretation of 
its message.1*6 As I pointed out above pp. 167-8 . in the parallel 
ί 43 Ίταραμνοείσβαι. The notion thai a divine being would need io be or could be 
" "propi t ia ted" by special cult-services prescribed b\ diviners would give away the 
spuriousness of the Thea$e· all by itself. e\ en if there were no other grounds on which it 
would be suspect. 144 Additional notes 6 3. 6.4. 6.5. 
14Î Here again, aj in n. 65 in ch. 6. I am quoting the 0.£.D.'$ definition of ihe nord . 
14b Had this crucial ditfeieiicc between a; and b been dulv noticed by Brickhouse &: Smith 
the> might have been siived from their view [hat " there are iomc moral truths to which 
[Socrates] has direct and certain access" through the daimorion 1989: 241 et pas sun . The 
error is a long-standing one Thus Zedier 1885:86' maintains that "Socrates was 
conscious within of divine revelations" and proceeds to explain this consciousness as ""the 
general form which a vivid, but unexplored sense of the propriety of particular actions 
assumed for the persona! consciousness of Socrates" ibid. 95 . dodging the question of the 
t-pistemic import which these states of consciousness would have had lor someone who did 
trull think of them as ' d iv ine rei tintions 
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case of the prophetic dream Socrates explicitly recognizes that the 
interpretation he puts on the surface-content of a supernatural sign 
at a given time may be in need of revision at a subsequent time. 
thereby" acknowledging the possibility- that at the earlier time he may 
have put the wrong interpretation on its message. There is no reason 
to suppose it would be different ir. the case of the daim.or.iar.. What the 
voice brings him is a message. For the true interpretation of that 
message he must rely entirely on his own. highly fallible, human 
resources. 
If we review the passages in Plato whose context is informative 
enough to enable us to tell what goes on in Socrates' mind when he 
speaks of receiving a monition from the daimonion^ we shall find that 
they fall into two classes: 
A) Socrates has independent grounds for accepting what the voice 
tells him to do or to believe - grounds which would have sufficed to 
persuade him of the correctness of that action or belief even in the 
absence of that signal. 
B" Socrates has a "hunch*1 - a strong intuitive impression - that 
a certain belief or action is correct without being able to articulate 
his grounds for it at the moment. 
Here are the passages that fall under Aï: 
A 1. Ap. 31C-32A. The daimonion has been opposing his par-
ticipation in politics. He says he "believes that it does very well in 
opposing me " 'πάγκαλος γέ μοι δοκΞΪέναντιοϋσθαι ) for if he had got 
into politics long ago he '" would have perished long ago and done no 
good to [them] or to himself." His perception that participation in 
politics would be unlikely to benefit the Athenians, while being 
virtually certain to bring about his own destruction is, clearly, a 
rational ground for keeping out of politics, regardless of what, if 
anything, he heard from the daimonion on that score. 
A) 2. Ap. 40A-C. The silence of the daimonion- the fact that it did 
not oppose the line of defense he took at his trial - is, he says, " a 
great indication μέγα τεκμήριον 1 4 ; for him"' that no evil will befall 
147 " I n d i c a t i o n " for τεκμ-τρ.ον in Allen, " i n t i m a t i o n " originally in Jowett. T h e word is 
frequently rendered '"proof" in translations of the passage [so most recently in Brickhouse 
& Smith, 1989: 237fr".'. But the Greek counterpart for "proof" would be άττόδειξίΐ. No 
interpretation of this tevt uhtch understands Socrates to be getting "proof" of something 
or oiher from the silence of the daimonion could be justified by appeal to the use of 
τεκμήριον in this passage 
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him as a result of the death to which he has been sentenced. But that 
death is nn evil he establishes on rational grounds which are entirely 
independent of input by the daimonion. He does so at 2QA. where the 
daimonion has not yet been brought into his speech, and then again, 
more elaborately, at 40C-41C, a passage he introduces by saying 
" a n d let us undeibtand ίέννοήσωμεν) the matter in this way." If the 
divine monition had not come. Socrates would stilj have had the 
rationally grounded belief that death is no evil. 
(A) 3. Ap. 20E. taken together with 33c. The daimonion is not 
named in either passage. In the former he says that " t h e god has 
commanded me, as I assumed and believed, that I ought to live 
philosophizing, examining myself and others," without specifying 
the means by which the command was conveyed to him. In the latter 
he says that " t o do this, as I maintain1** was commanded me by the 
god through both divinations and oracles and by every other means 
by which divine dispensation has ever commanded a human being 
to do anything"' - this is sweeping enough to allow us to infer that 
" t h e c o m m a n d " was supported ex silentio by the daimonion though 
noi articulated by its "voice"' (which would contradict the 
subsequent statement that " the voice always deters, never enjoins";. 
T h a t Socrates has rational grounds for philosophizing should go 
without saying. From these he would infer that the god being what 
he is wishing the best that could be achieved by human means for 
the Athenians , and Socrates being what he is uniquely endowed 
with the capacitv to bring home to his fellows the supreme 
importance of the pursuit of moral perfection", philosophizing is 
what would constitute the best service he could render the god. 
Here are the passages that fall under Β : 
Β ι. Tht. 151c. When one-time associates of his who have drifted 
away from him return and beg to be readmitted to his company " the 
daimonion which comes to me forbids it in the case of some, allows it 
in that of others, and they ate the ones that make progress." Here 
Socrates stops from doing something '"without being able at the 
time to explain to himself the motive of reason and feeling which 
checked h i m " ^Campbell. 18G1 : ad he). He is acting, as we all do 
often enough in life, on a " h u n c h " ' - o n grounds we cannot 
articulate explicitly at the moment, but which seem nonetheless 
convincing enough to justify action. 
148 T h e words 1 have italicized here and in the preceding quotation emphasize the pergonal 
nature of the interpretation he is putting on the supernatural signs to which he refers. 
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Β -2. Eud. 272E. He was alone ir. ïhc palacs.ua, silting, and was 
about 10 get up. when " the customary di\inc sign" checked him so 
he sat down. He acted on just a " h u n c h " that he had best sit a little 
longer, and so lie did 
Β β. Phdr. 242E-C. "As I was about to cross the stream the 
customary divine sign came to me - it holds me back from doing 
what I am about to do on each occasion [on which it comes] - and 
I seemed to hear a voice, forbidding me to leave the spot until I had 
made atonement for some offense to the god." Here Socrates has 
good reasons for making atonement for that offense. He proceeds to 
state them: he had spoken irreverently about love in his first speech. 
But at the moment to which he refers those reasons had not vet been 
clearly articulated in his mind, and they had been even less clearly 
articulated earlier on. while delivering that first speech, «hen 
"something divinatorv" 24207 "disturbed h im." Divination and 
the daimonion are cited in explanation of his reluctance to leave before 
making amends to god for his impious first speech about love 
reluctance which had been insistent, but became articulate only in 
retrospect. 
From these passages, which give us content enough to enable us to 
tell what is going on in Socrate»' mind when a visitation of the 
daimonion occurs, we can satisfy ourselves that none of them implies or 
even suggests that he would have been willing to accept a prompting 
from that source if it had offered counsel obnoxious io his moral reason. To 
be sure, if Socrates knew that X is a command from the infinitely wise 
god this would trump any rational scruples he might have had about 
it. But that is preciseli what he does not know. All he has is subjective 
states of mind, putativ el y caused by the god. whose import remains 
to be determined by himself. Think, for example, of a command like 
that which Abraham gets in Genesis 22: "Take thou thy son, thine 
only son. Isaac, whom thou lovest Get thee into the land of Moriah 
and offer him as a burnt offering." While Abraham could have 
taken, and did take, the surface content of the sign he got from God 
as its real meaning. Socrates could not. Both Abraham and Socrates 
believe that God is good and wills only good for those who serve him. 
And this would give both Abraham and Socrates a reason for 
doubling that God could be commanding something so horrendously 
iniquitous as killing an innocent child. But for Abraham faith trumps 
reason and he is praised for this by Kierkegaard a< a "knight of 
faith." Not so in the case of Socrates, who lives with a commitment 
to argumentative reason ;τι in chapter 61 for which there is no 
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parallel in Abraham or any other Old Testament figure. The god 
Socrates serves has only the attributes which Socrates' eleuctîc 
reason would approve Tf the daimonion were ever to give a message 
which contradicts the character Socratic reason establishes for the 
gods the message would thereby condemn itself as a vagary of his 
own fancy instead of a true command from his god. 
Nonetheless the impression persists in the mind of some readers of 
the Apology that Socrates does allow his " s ign" to trump a decision 
he has reached on rational grounds. The impression is articulated as 
a formal thesis by my friends, Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas 
Smith (1989:, in their book Socrates on Trial and then again in their 
letter to Τ LS of J a n u a r y 26 — February 1. 1990. To support their 
thesis that Socrates docs allow it they refer to Apology 3 ID—E. But does 
that passage really provide evidence for their thesis? It certainly 
would if what is said there were, as they claim in their letter, that 
Socrates had " already decided to engage in [political] activity" and 
the "sign"' supervened to oppose the decision. They had made the 
same claim previously in their book: the daimonion opposed him 
" e a c h time he has resolved to undertake political activity" 
'. 1989: 168 : "'it opposed him each time he has tried"" to go into 
politics ( 169). 
But is this said in the text? Does Socrates say he had decided to go 
into politics, had resolved to do so, and had tried to do so? No. Not a 
word there to indicate that he had done any of these things. All he 
says is that the daimonion "opposes my engaging in politics" 3 1 05 . 
and that he sees good reason for its doing so (31D6- E2), When the 
text is closely read all we learn from it is that his ""sign " opposes his 
going into politics, and that so docs his reason. "Sign"' and reason 
are in accord. There is no trumping. 
How is it then that Brickhouse and Smith take that text as evidence 
to the contrary? T h e answer is made disarmingly plain in their letter 
to TLS: ' ' the daimonion could not have ' turned [Socrates] away" 
from political activity unless he had already decided to engage in 
such activity." Surely this is false. Consider: I am offered a job that 
would double my pay but might prove disastrous in other ways. I 
spend a sleepless night turning over the offer, sugar-plums of bigger 
pay dancing in my head. I rise almost ready to write the letter of 
acceptance. If I were favored with a divine sign solicitous of my 
welfare wouldn't that be a good time for it to speak its "Don' t " " , 
instead of waiting until after I " h a d already decided"' to accept? 
Socrates must have often been in like need of his sign's advice. 
Living in a city that practices participatory democracv and enjoins 
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the ethos epitomized by Pericles in Thucydides 12.40.2 . " t h e man 
who takes no parr in politics we regard not as one who meddles with 
nothing but who is good for nothing. "' Socrates, an ultra-
conscientious man. seeing dreadful goings-un close to him, must 
often have had twinges of self-questioning, often wondered if he was 
right to persist with mulish obstinacy in his principled abstention 
from politics, and in specially trying circumstances - say, on the 
morning when the question of exterminating Melos would be 
coming up for debate in the Assembly - had all but reached the 
point of doing what his conscience had vetoed heretofore. But did he 
ever go as far as deciding and resolving to do i t 3 Would he have tried 
it. if his "s ign' ' had not intervened? This is what we do not know and 
shall never know if we stick to the evidence and continue doing 
history instead of switching to historical romance. 
6.2 Ό.ν 533D-536A 1 4 9 
This is a remarkable passage, unique among Plato's earlier 
compositions in its exuberance of poetic imagery: the poet is a 
" magnet"" : he is a "winged " creature : he is a " bee" carrying away 
sweetness from honied fountains untranslatable pun on μέλι, μέλη. 
μελιτται, μελιρρύτων, μελοττοιών. 534 Α — Ε : n e ^ n ^ e t n e " bac­
chantes drawing milk and honey from streams"' (534A). In 
explaining the poet to us, Plato lets Socrates speak like a poet for the 
nonce. But he does not make Socrates abandon his customary 
clenciic role on that account. What is different here in Socrates" 
practice of clenchus is his propounding in extenso a challenging theorv 
before proceeding to vindicate it argumentatively. This reversal of the 
usual order in no way diminishes the vigor oi" his elenctic argument 
when he does come around to it. Pace Yerdenius 1943: -'33fr. at 235, 
"il ne saurait démontrer cette conviction" . Socrates uses elenctic 
argument forcefully .53Goff.: to refute Ion's claim that he "does not 
praise Homer in a state of possession and madness κατεχόμενος και 
μαινόμενος'." And pace the remark of Wilamowitz ,1948: iooi that 
in this dialogue Socrates does more "dozieren" than questioning. 
once Socrates gets pa*t the exposition of the "possession" theorv 
• 5 3 3 D 5 3 5 A a n c * 535E—536i>), Socrates is as assiduous and deft a 
questioner and arguer in the Ion as in any of Plato's Socratic 
dialogues. 
With this passage we should read Ap. 22B—c, — τ ι ο in ch. 6 - a 
14C) See ch. 6, p. 168. 
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